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COMMENT
CRIMINAL LAW -

CONCURRENT

SENTENCING

-

Multiple Convictions
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-1-508 and

DeBose v. People, 488 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1971)
INTRODUCTION

the recent case of DeBose v. People' the Colorado Supreme
Court held that: (1) since robbery 2 and conspiracy to commit
robbery3 constitute separate and distinct offenses, multiple convictions may be obtained for their commission; and (2) the
separate offenses of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery
may be punished, in the discretion of the trial court, by consecutive sentences. In so holding the court adopted the common
law rule which prevails in the United States. 4 The new Colorado Criminal Code,5 enacted a few months prior to the court
opinion in DeBose, deals with both consecutive sentences and
multiple convictions and became effective on July 1, 1972. This
comment examines the impact of the new Colorado Criminal
Code upon the rule recently established by the Colorado Supreme Court in DeBose.
N

I. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS

The first part of the DeBose holding established that a defendant may be convicted for both robbery and conspiracy to
commit robbery. Section 40-1-508(1) of the recently enacted
Colorado Criminal Code, however, bars multiple convictions for
several types of multiple charges, 6 but it does not bar multiple
convictions for conspiracy and the related substantive offense.
1 488 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1971).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-5-1

(Supp. 1967).

3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-35 (1963).

4 See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); United States
v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915); Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d
742 (9th Cir. 1955).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40

(Supp. 1971).

6 Id. § 40-1-508(1).
Prosecutionof multiple counts for same act. (1) When any conduct
of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He
may not be convicted of more than one offense if:
(a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (5) of this section; or
(b) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the
other; or
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Although section 40-1-508(1) was supposedly adopted from
section 1.07 of the Model Penal Code,' the Colorado Criminal
Code omits the portion of the Model Act which provides:
When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant
. may not
... be convicted of more than one offense if . . (b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other .... 8

Instead, the Colorado legislature substituted in its place
language barring multiple convictions for attempt and the substantive offense. By virtue of this substitution it appears that
the legislature agrees with the DeBose rule that multiple convictions may be obtained for the separate and distinct offenses
of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.
II. CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES?

DeBose also established that related multiple offenses may
be punished, in the discretion of the trial court, by consecutive
sentences. The new Colorado statute, however, provides that
concurrent sentencing will be required in situations in which
multiple prosecutions are prohibited. That prohibition, which
is a significant innovation in itself, is briefly examined prior to
the discussion of concurrent sentencing.
A.

Multiple Prosecutions
The potential of prosecutorial abuse in multiple prosecutions has recently received much attention. Procedural rules
which allow the prosecutor to hold separate trials for separate
offenses arising from the same transaction permit the prosecutor to engage in "jury shopping" a technique by which prosecutions may continue until a verdict satisfactory to the prosecutor is rendered."' Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in

(c)
(d)
(e)

7 Id. The
adopted
added).

Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the
commission of the offenses; or
The offenses differ only in that cne is defined to prohibit
a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to
prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or
The offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct
and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted,
unless the law provides that specific periods or instances
of such conduct constitute separate offenses.
Comment states erroneously: "Subsection (1) of this section is
without change from Model Penal Code Section 1.07." (emphasis

8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (Proposed Final Draft, 1962).
:9Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 n.3 (1969).
'1 Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S.
464 (1958).
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Ashe v. Swenson,1 argued that the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy ought to be construed to include protection from "jury shopping." The Colorado legislature appears
to have adopted Justice Brennan's formulation in section 40-1508(2) of the Criminal Code:
If the several offenses are known to the district attorney
at the time of commencing the prosecution and were committed within his judicial district, all such offenses upon which
the district attorney elects to proceed must be prosecuted by
separate counts in a single prosecution if they are based on the
same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode. Any such offense not thus joined by separate count cannot thereafter be the basis of a subsequent prosecution.1 2

Although the section contains the limitations that the prosecutor must be aware of the offense and that the offense must
have been committed within his judicial district, these limitations do not dilute the effective prohibition on "jury shopping."
It is important to remember that this subsection does not bar
multiple convictions; it merely requires the state to seek such
convictions in a single trial whenever the offenses charged
occurred within the same criminal episode.
B.

Concurrent Sentencing

Section 40-1-508 (3) requires that under certain circumstances
any sentences imposed upon multiple convictions run concurrently:
When two or more offenses are charged as required by
subsection (2) of this section and they are supported by identical evidence, the court upon application of the defendant may
require the state, at the conclusion of all the evidence, to elect
the count upon which the issues shall be tried. If more than
one guilty verdict is returned as to any defendant in a prosecution where multiple counts are tried as required by subsection
(2) of this section, the sentences imposed must run concurrently."

The term "identical evidence" is employed to identify a situation
where only one "crime" has been committed, apparently codifying the Blockburger additional fact test 1 4 for determining when
the traditional double jeopardy protection applies. According to
this test, robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery are separate
and distinct offenses, since each requires the proof of a fact not
11 397 U.S. 436, 488 (1969)
12
1
3
14

COLO.

REV.

STAT.

Id. § 40-1-508(3).

(concurring opinion).
(Supp. 1971).

ANN. § 40-1-508(2)

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). "[T]he test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provisicn requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."
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necessary to the proof of the other. This distinction was considered to be of major importance by the majority of the court
in DeBose.15 The second sentence of subsection (3), however,
requires that any jail terms imposed upon multiple convictions
run concurrently. 1 This sentence, taken alone, appears to overrule the second holding in DeBose.
It might be argued, however, that subsection (3) taken as a
whole, is applicable only in "identical evidence" situations and,
thus, provides different protections at different stages of the
same prosecution. This argument would contend that the second
sentence of the subsection is applicable only when the court
does not require the state to make an election as provided in
17
the first sentence. But this is not a proper interpretation. The
two sentences of subsection (3) should be read separately because they apply to mutually exclusive fact situations. In the
first, an identical evidence situation, there is only one "crime,"
and therefore, as a matter of law, only one conviction can occur,
and the bar against consecutive sentences is inapplicable. This
merely codifies the Blockburger test."8 In the second fact situation, multiple convictions are anticipated: a defendant need
only show that his case is subject to the requirements of subsection (2) to receive protection from consecutive sentences.
Since the two sentences of subsection (3) refer to different fact
situations, it is clear that they are independent.
The question remaining, then, is whether the crimes of
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery must be prosecuted
as separate counts in a single prosecution under subsection (2).
The critical language of that provision is the phrase "same act
or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode." The
Drafting Committee Comment indicates that this phrase is
15 DeBose v. People, 488 P.2d 69, 70 (Colo. 1971).
"'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-508(3) (Supp. 1971). The provision employs the terms "guilty verdict" and "tried." If a defendant pleads
guilty to the charges (as the defendant did in DeBose), he would be
unable to qualify for the protection from consecutive sentences. It is,
however, doubtful that a court would be inclined to construe these
terms strictly, because to do so would be to provide protection to only
those defendants who exercise their constitutional right to a trial by
jury.
17 Interview with former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Otto Moore
and Harvey Cochran (members of the Drafting Committee of the Colorado Criminal Code), Legislative Drafting Office, Denver, Colorado,
Nov. 3, 1971. The drafters intended that these sentences be taken
separately. It would be bizarre, indeed, to give a defendant protection
from more than one conviction, and to allow him the lesser protection
of barring ccnsecutive sentences if he failed to exercise his right to the
former protection.
18 Test quoted note 14 supra.
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synonymous with "same conduct or criminal transaction.' 19 A
"criminal transaction" is not limited to each individual violation
of a separate statutory provision; it includes all of the violations which a defendant commits while pursuing a single objective. 2 All of the acts of the conspiracy and the commission
of the substantive offense were directed at accomplishing the
same purpose: the successful completion of the robbery. Thus,
these crimes fall within the phrase "series of acts arising from
the same criminal episode."'2' Even the majority of the court
in DeBose characterized the defendant's actions as a single
course of conduct in the same criminal transaction.2 2 Therefore,
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery are offenses which
must be prosecuted as separate counts in a single prosecution
as required by subsection (2), and if multiple convictions are
obtained, consecutive sentences may not be imposed.
CONCLUSION

As a result of the enactment of the Colorado Criminal Code,
the DeBose rule allowing consecutive sentences for multiple
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode has been shortlived. 23 Although it is not clear whether the Colorado legislature intended to leave the remainder of the DeBose rule intact the rule allowing multiple convictions for conspiracy and the
substantive offense - it is clear that they have done so.
The legislature has, thereby, adopted an interesting middle
ground: in a DeBose factual situation, the judge may no longer
impose consecutive sentences, but a parole board may (must?)
take into account the fact that the defendant is serving a sentence for more than one offense. Unless the legislature intends
9
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-508(2), Comment (Supp. 1971).
24In re Ward, 64 Cal. 2d 672, 414 P.2d 400, 51 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1966); Neal
v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
21 Moore and Cochran Interview, supra note 17. The drafters used this
language with the specific intent to include conspiracy and the substantive offense which was the object of the conspiracy, as well as other
fact situations.
22 DeBcse v. People, 488 P.2d 69, 70 (Colo. 1971). The court here applies
the Blockburger test (quoted note 14 supra) - "[t]he test as to whether
the same act or transaction constitutes two distinct crimes or offenses
....
" This test is applicable cnly when the charges are either assumed
or cha-acterized to have arisen from the same act or transaction.
23 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-501 (1) (f) (Supp. 1971). This provision

indicates that if a significant change in the law has been applied to the
applicant's conviction or sentence which, in the interests of justice,
requires retroactive

application

of the changed

legal standard, the

defendant is entitled to post-conviction review even if his conviction
was affirmed on appeal. From this it would appear that DeBose might
be able to have his consecutive sentences changed to run concurrently,
especially since they were affirmed after passage of the new Code.
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to direct the parole authorities to differentiate on this basis,
there is little reason to exclude conspiracy and the substantive
offense from those multiple charges for which multiple convictions are barred. If the legislature did not so intend, a verbatim
adoption of section 1.07 (b) of the Model Penal Code would avoid
24
an unnecessary ambiguity.
Scott Anderson, Jr.

24

See p. 592 & note 8 supra.

